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In May 2024, at first glance, it seems difficult to imagine a less favorable international context for celebrating the 20th anniversary of Poland's membership in the EU than the conditions still prevailing just beyond the eastern borders of both the EU and Poland. The ongoing full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine, which has been raging for over two years, and the troubling political developments in Georgia under Russian influence, provide an opportunity to reflect on the significance of the European integration process for Poland – and vice versa.
Looking back to Poland's accession to the EU in May 2004, it is important to remember that this moment marked both an end and a beginning. It effectively closed the so-called post-communist period, during which Poles – along with Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Slovenians, and later Bulgarians and Romanians who joined the Union three years later – underwent a deep political, economic, and social transformation that enabled them to join the common market and community formed over half a century earlier during the Cold War's geopolitical division of the European continent. In this context, the frequently cited phrase "return to Europe," as seen on the cover of the May 1, 2004 issue of the weekly magazine Polityka (no. 18 (2450)), aptly reflected the satisfaction of many Poles with the achievements of the few years that had passed since the start of the systemic transformation in 1989.
However, it also marked the beginning of a new era, characterized by a mix of emotions typical of such moments – from hope to fear regarding new opportunities and challenges for the Polish state within a still-forming group of nations deciding their common fate together, despite their differences. Achieving this historical milestone, which many Poles believed restored a sense of normalcy regarding the country's affiliation with the West (further strengthened by joining NATO in 1999), did not entirely erase from their consciousness the fact that just a few months earlier, the leader of a key – historically friendly – European partner, namely France, had expressed open irritation at Poland's and other Central European countries' attempts to assert their independence from the so-called "old Europe" in relations with the United States, in the context of the dispute over the Iraq War. From today's perspective, it seems that in 2003, Western European countries were not entirely ready to fully accept this new normal of a polyphonic Europe within an expanded EU.
Given these aspects, it is impossible to assess the balance of these twenty years of membership as anything other than positive, especially in light of the war in Ukraine. The consequences of Russian aggression for the EU's defense and security policy most clearly highlight the path Poland, as a European actor, has taken from membership to full – and finally recognized – subjectivity on the international stage. While neither the Russian aggression on Georgia in 2008, nor the annexation of Crimea, nor even the recognition by Russia of the so-called people's republics in Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 fundamentally altered the critical Western European view of Poland's (and the Baltic states') hardline stance against Kremlin's attempts to undermine the European territorial order, it was only the shock caused by the wide-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 that led to a paradigm shift in the policies of Germany, France, and other leading EU states towards Moscow. Initially with difficulty, Berlin and Paris acknowledged that the assessments of Polish experts and policymakers over the past few years were not based on some atavistic, historically motivated Russophobia but were the result of a correct analysis of Russian authorities' intentions.
While it is regrettable that the Franco-German tandem's realization came so late after years of maintaining the illusion that "Putin can be dealt with," it is also necessary to recognize the breakthrough revision of their previous stance and Poland's contribution to this shift. Interestingly, despite deep antagonisms in the Polish political landscape and existing differences between major parties in defining the trends and priorities of foreign policy, the fundamental vigilance regarding Europe's security in the face of the resurgence of Russian imperialism and the revival of the idea of "Russkiy mir" characterized the programs of most Polish political groups, often almost cross-party.
The successes of Poland's EU membership can certainly be measured by economic growth, investments in infrastructure, or the improvement of living standards, which, aside from EU funds, would not have been possible without the tremendous effort of the Poles themselves. It seems, however, that a good indicator – although directly more qualitative than quantitative – is provided by comparing Poland's influence on defining the direction of EU foreign policy twenty years ago and today. As a key actor in Central Europe within the Union, Poland has contributed and continues to contribute – albeit not without hiccups or difficulties – to strengthening Europe and the idea of the West.
Pierre-Frédéric Weber
Doctor with a habilitation degree, a historian specialising in modern history, and an associate professor of the Szczecin University at the Institute of History (Faculty of Humanities), long-term member of the Foundation Council of the Krzyżowa Foundation for Mutual Understanding in Europe
